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Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to generalize the incomplete contract model of Bajari and
Tadelis (2001) into a continuous model, and to derive the condition under which the
monotone comparative statics (MCS) methods can be applied. I will show that a type of
single-crossing condition on the isoprobability curves of uncertainty is necessary and
su￿cient for the availability of the MCS methods when a player has a supermodular ex post
utility function. In this case, the greater the magnitude of uncertainty, the less his optimal
contract allows the project to proceed smoothly.
I wish to express my gratitude, particularly to Masahiro Okuno-Fujiwara, Hirokazu Tak- izawa, and Taisuke Matsubae for their
valuable advice. I also wish to thank Takahiro Fujimoto, Tomoya Yashiro, Masao Ando, Satoshi Yoshida, and other members of
the Construction Indus- try Architecture study group at The University of Tokyo for their helpful discussions. Of course, I am
solely responsible for any remaining errors. This work is supported, in part, by a grant from the Japan Federation of Housing
Organizations.
Citation: Watanabe, Yasunori, (2008) "A monotone comparative static result on contract incompleteness." Economics
Bulletin, Vol. 4, No. 16 pp. 1-8
Submitted: March 27, 2008.  Accepted: June 12, 2008.
URL: http://economicsbulletin.vanderbilt.edu/2008/volume4/EB-08D80017A.pdf1 Introduction
Bajari and Tadelis (2001, henceforth, B-T) have developed an incomplete contract
model, and have analyzed the types of contracts in construction industries. They showed
that the diﬀerence was not based on the asymmetry between builders and owners as the
principal-agent theory suggests, rather, it was based on the magnitude of uncertainty
they both builders and owners are confronting with.
In B-T’s model, an owner who wishes to procure a building prepares the design of
the project in advance, and asks a builder to comply with it. Thus, the design can
be considered as a contract. The project involves certain uncertainties that are not
apparent at the beginning, for example, the condition of the ground, the owner’s actual
needs, and so on. One extreme way of dealing with such uncertainties is to describe every
prescription for every possible event in the design, the builder then proceeds with the
project as suggested. However, from a practical viewpoint, it not only is very diﬃcult to
anticipate all possible events but also to describe clauses concerning them. Thus, it is
natural to include some clauses in advance, and to hold renegotiations among stakeholders
when an unforeseen event takes place. B-T analyzed the number of prescriptions that
the owner should have in the contract in advance, that is, how speciﬁc a contract she
(the owner) should prepare ex ante. However, they showed that the greater the amount
of uncertainty involved, the less speciﬁc is the contract that she prefers.
B-T used a discrete model, where they deﬁned a construction project as a combina-
tion of the number of possible states T and a probability distribution (ft)T
t=1 on them.
Moreover, they stated that “project T is more complex than project T 0,” if the follow-
ing two conditions are satisﬁed: (i) (ft)T
t=1 dominates (f0
t)T0
t=1 in the sense of ﬁrst-order
stochastic dominance, (ii) the states in project T are constructed by dividing some state
in project T 0. However, in their analysis, they assumed that the second condition is
automatically implied by the ﬁrst condition, and treated the number of states T as an
index of complexity. Therefore, there was no discussion about the property that the
probability distributions must satisfy. My main purpose is to derive such a property in
a more general setting.
Since the work of Milgrom and Shannon (1994), the monotone comparative statics
(MCS) methods have been widely researched recently. Among the recent works, see
Athey (1998) and Athey (2002) for details about the application of the MCS methods to
decision-making problems under uncertainty.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. The set of possible
events is assumed to be continuous, and I assume that the player’s ex post utility function
is supermodular. In section 3, I derive the condition under which the MCS methods can
be applied to the model. I will also show that the optimal contracts have a monotone
property with respect to the magnitude of uncertainty. Section 4 concludes the work. In
the appendix, I list the theorems of Topkis (1998) that are used in my proofs.
2 The Model
In this section, I propose a general model of contract incompleteness. This model is
an extension of B-T’s model. The main purpose is to specify the conditions under which
1the monotone comparative statics methods can be applied to the model.
A player is to implement a project with uncertainty. The uncertainty will be resolved
after the launch of the project, and an event will be brought to realization during the
project. The event aﬀects the implementation of the project. Let t 2 R+ be the event
that is realized ex post. I assume that t is ex post veriﬁable, and is drawn from a family
of distribution functions indexed by θ 2 Θ. Let the cumulative distribution functions be
F : R+£Θ 7! R+. Suppose that F is atomless and is absolutely continuous in t for all θ.
The parameter θ represents the magnitude of ex ante uncertainty. The following is
an assumption about it.




That is, the larger θ becomes, the more uncertain it would be ex ante.
The events are ordered from the most probable event t = 0 to inﬁnity, based on the
likelihood of its occurrence ex ante, irrespective of the parameter θ. This assumption is
expressed by allowing the density function of the events to be monotonically nonincreasing
in t.




where the subscripts represent the derivatives of the functions.
As the ex post events can aﬀect the progression of the project, the player may make
a list of clauses about them ex ante. I assume that there is a cost involved for including
clauses about ex post events, thus, it is impossible to have a contract that includes clauses
for all events ex ante. I will later discuss this point in detail. In this list, the player has
arrangements that describe prescriptions for each event that he has selected, moreover,
he treats θ as given. For example, consider an insurance contract. The buyer has to
decide which contract she should buy before any accidents take place, however, on the
other hand, she knows how uncertain they would be, therefore, depending on her ex ante
knowledge, she determines which clauses should or should not be included in the contract.
As I have mentioned above, it is costly to preface a contract. I represent the set of
events that are selected in the contract by S. S is assumed to be an element in the
family of Borel set B of R+. The cost of prefacing a contract S 2 B is represented by
C(S) ´ g(µ(S)) for the Lebesgue measure µ and some nondecreasing function g, which
is assumed to be twice continuously diﬀerentiable, g0 ¸ 0 and g00 ¸ 0.
When the uncertainty is resolved and some event t is brought about, if the contract
contains a clause about t, then the project would progress according to it. On the other
hand, if there is no clause about t, the stakeholders have to coordinate their actions
with regard to the implementation of the project. Therefore, the ex post diﬃculty of the
project depends on whether or not t 2 S. The diﬃculty is represented as an ex post state
2ω 2 Ω ´ f0,1g. As ω depends on both the ex ante contract S 2 B and the ex post event
t 2 R+, I describe it as a function h : B £ R+ 7! Ω, and
h(S,t) =
{
1 if t 2 S
0 if t 62 S
. (3)
Finally, I deﬁne the player’s ex post utility. Let X µ R be a nonempty set. X is a set of
the player’s ex post alternatives. The terminal utility is determined by his choice of x, the
ex post event t, and the ex post state ω. Let his utility function be u : X £R+£Ω 7! R+.
The properties of u are assumed as follows.
Assumption 3. u(x,t,ω) is supermodular in (x,¡t,ω).
Remark 1. This assumption implies that the order of the ex post event t not only de-
pends on the likelihood of its occurrence but also on the player’s utility function. Although
this appears to be too restrictive, what is important in the discussions below is the super-
modularity between x and ω. Thus, assuming that the utility does not depend on t does
not change the following results.
3 Analysis
First, I will solve the player’s problem, assuming the ex post event and state as given.
Then, taking this solution into consideration, the ex ante optimal contract will be derived.




Let its maximized value be v(t,ω). The next lemma is derived from the results of Topkis
(1998).
Lemma 1. 1 Let (¡T) be the reverse-ordered set of R+. Suppose either
(i). X is ﬁnite or
(ii). X is compact and u(x,t,ω) is upper semicontinuous in x on X for every (t,ω) on
R+ £ Ω
is satisﬁed. Then, v(t,ω) exists and is supermodular in (¡t,ω) on (¡T)£Ω. Furthermore,




and they are monotonically increasing in (¡t,ω) on (¡T) £ Ω.
Proof. When either (i) or (ii) is satisﬁed, u(x,t,ω) is bounded above on X for all (t,ω).
And this implies that there always exists a maximum value of u(x,t,ω) on X for all (t,ω).
Therefore, by Theorem A.1, v(t,ω) is supermodular in (¡t,ω) on (¡T) £ Ω.
Moreover, by Theorem A.2, there exist a greatest element and a least element of
argmaxx2X u(x,t,ω), and they are increasing in (¡t,ω) on (¡T) £ Ω.
1I thank an anonymous referee for suggestions to improve this lemma.
3Next, given v(t,ω) acquired above, deﬁne the player’s ex ante expected utility respec-









He selects a contract S, which maximizes this expected utility. I can show that an interval
[0,ˆ t], which has the origin as an end, maximizes the expected utility with respect to the
Lebesgue measure being constant.
Lemma 2. For any given ¯ µ, let S = [0, ¯ µ]. Then





Thus, the interval S = [0, ¯ µ], which begins at 0, maximizes the expected payoﬀ V under
the condition that its Lebesgue measure is equal to ¯ µ.
Proof. Let t0 < ¯ µ < t00 and S = [0, ¯ µ]. Starting with S, deﬁne S0 as follows: remove an
inﬁnitesimal interval dt at t = t0, and add dt at t = t00 to S. Then, µ(S) = µ(S0) = ¯ µ,

















This is nonpositive by Assumption 2 and Lemma 1.
Lemma 2 reveals that I can concentrate on intervals [0,ˆ t] as ex ante contracts. There-
fore, I treat either ˆ t or the probability p = Prob(t · ˆ t) as control variables instead
of S. Given p and θ, deﬁne ˆ t(p,θ) as p = F(ˆ t(p,θ),θ). Furthermore, identifying p as
S = [0,ˆ t(p,θ)], the functions deﬁned on B will be treated as functions deﬁned on [0,1].









Before checking the property of this function, I will prove the supermodularity of ˆ t(p,θ).
Lemma 3. ˆ t(p,θ) is increasing in (p,θ) on [0,1] £ Θ. In addition, it is supermodular in

















Moreover, suppose F is twice continuously diﬀerentiable in t, diﬀerentiable in θ, and









4Proof. Since F is nondecreasing in t for all θ, the inverse function ˆ t is nondecreasing in
p. Furthermore, for all θ00 ¸ θ0 and p, it follows that
p = F(ˆ t(p,θ
0),θ
0) = F(ˆ t(p,θ
00),θ
00) · F(ˆ t(p,θ
00),θ
0).
By Assumption 1. Since F is nondecreasing in t, I obtain ˆ t(p,θ00) ¸ ˆ t(p,θ0).
Suppose (7) holds for all (t0,θ0) and (t00,θ00) such that F(t0,θ0) = F(t00,θ00). F is
assumed to be absolutely continuous for all θ, and has its derivative Ft. Since ˆ t is the








For all θ00 ¸ θ0, I have F(ˆ t(p,θ00),θ00) = F(ˆ t(p,θ0),θ0) = p and ˆ t(p,θ00) ¸ ˆ t(p,θ0). By (7),
these conditions imply that
Ft(ˆ t(p,θ
0),θ
















that is, ˆ t is supermodular in (p,θ). The opposite direction is straightforward and I skip
the proof.
Next, I will analyze the case in which some additional diﬀerentiability conditions hold.
Suppose F is twice continuously diﬀerentiable in t, diﬀerentiable in θ, and has the cross-
derivative Ftθ. Let p = F(ˆ t(p,θ),θ). Diﬀerentiating both sides of this equation by p and
θ, I obtain























































The expression in the curly brackets is nonpositive for any (p,θ) if and only if (8) holds
for any (t,θ). This concludes the proof.
The supermodularity of the cost function C(p,θ) = g(ˆ t(p,θ)) immediately follows this
lemma.
I will discuss some points about the conditions in this lemma. First, to identify the
equivalence between (7) and (8), it will suﬃce to diﬀerentiate Ft(ˆ t(p,θ),θ) in θ. Next, (7)
can be interpreted as follows. Suppose, given a probability p, the player has to prepare
a contract in which the probability of including a clause about events ex post is exactly
p. If he attempts to prepare this contract more speciﬁcally and include some additional
clauses, then the greater the magnitude of uncertainty, the less the increment of the ex
ante probability. In another words, if he wishes to increase the ex ante probability by
some ﬁxed degree, then the more greater the magnitude of uncertainty ex ante, the larger
is the number of clauses that he must include. Finally, note that (8) implies that the slope
of the isoprobability curve of F is nondecreasing in t. Therefore, this condition can be
regarded as a type of single-crossing condition about the isoprobability curve. However,
they never cross each other on their domain.
Using the supermodularity of ˆ t derived as above, I will prove the supermodularity of
V .
Lemma 4. If ˆ t is supermodular in (p,θ) on [0,1] £ Θ, then V (p,θ) is supermodular in
(¡p,θ) on [0,1] £ Θ.
Proof. Diﬀerentiating V (p,θ) with p provides
∂V (p,θ)
∂p
= (v(ˆ t,1)Ft(ˆ t(p,θ),θ) ¡ v(ˆ t,0)Ft(ˆ t(p,θ),θ))
∂ˆ t(p,θ)
∂p





= v(ˆ t(p,θ),1) ¡ v(ˆ t(p,θ),0).







00),1) ¡ v(ˆ t(p,θ
00),0)) ¡ (v(ˆ t(p,θ
0),1) ¡ v(ˆ t(p,θ
0),0)) · 0.
6The last inequality is derived from the fact that ˆ t is increasing in θ and that v is super-
modular in (¡t,ω).
I shall now prove the main theorem.
Theorem 1. Suppose either (7) or (8) is satisﬁed. Then, for all θ, there exist a greatest
and a least element of
arg max
p2[0,1]
V (p,θ) ¡ C(p,θ), (11)
and they are monotonically nonincreasing in θ.
Proof. Note that argmaxp2[0,1] V (p,θ) ¡ C(p,θ) is nonempty. By Lemmas 3 and 4,
V (p,θ)¡C(p,θ) is supermodular in (¡p,θ). Hence, by Theorem A.2, there exist a great-
est and a least element of argmaxp2[0,1] V (p,θ) ¡ C(p,θ), and they are monotonically
nonincreasing in θ.
Intuitively speaking, if the single-crossing condition on the uncertainty is satisﬁed,
the greater the magnitude of uncertainty, the less the optimal choice of the probability
with which an ex ante contract contains a clause about an ex post event. Note that the
increase of θ aﬀects the optimal choice of the probability in two ways. First, for any given
ex ante contract, it reduces the probability with which the events listed in the contract
would happen. Second, the greater the magnitude of uncertainty, the more clauses you
need to improve an ex ante contract, and this leads to the higher marginal cost of writing
the contract. As a result, the optimal choice of the probability is nonincreasing function
of the magnitude of uncertainty.
4 Conclusion
In this paper, I extended B-T’s model into a continuous model, and derived a con-
dition under which the MCS methods can be applied. The intuitive interpretation of
the condition is also provided. The main result indicated that if the supermodularity
of ex post utility function is assumed, then a type of single-crossing condition of the
isoprobability curves of uncertainty is necessary and suﬃcient.
7A Appendix
In this appendix, I list the theorems of Topkis (1998) that are used in my proofs.
The main result on the maximization of supermodular functions is the following the-
orem.
Theorem A.1 (Topkis (1998)). If X and T are lattices, S is a sublattice of X £ T,
f : X £ T 7! R is supermodular in (x,t) on S, St is the section of S at t in T, and
g(t) = supx2St f(x,t) is ﬁnite on the projection ΠTS of S on T, then g(t) is supermodular
on ΠTS.
The next theorem assures the monotonicity of solutions.
Theorem A.2 (Topkis (1998)). Suppose that X is a nonempty lattice, T is a partially
ordered set, f : X £ T 7! R is supermodular in x on X for each t in T, and f is
supermodular in (x,t) on X £ T. If either
(i). X is ﬁnite or
(ii). X is a compact subset of Rn and f is upper semicontinuous in x on X for each t
in T,
then each argmaxx2X f(x,t) (being either ﬁnite or a compact subset of Rn) is a nonempty
sublattice of X with a greatest element and a least element, and the greatest (least) element
of argmaxx2X f(x,t) is increasing in t on T.
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